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Jewish Philosophies After Heidegger:
Imagining a Dialogue Between Jonas and Levinas

*

Lawrence Vogel
Connecticut College

The divergent paths taken by Martin Heidegger, Hans Jonas and
Emmanuel Levinas have their common source in a disappointment with
Edmund Husserl’s promise to bring philosophy back to life by way of the
phenomenological method. Each of Husserl's students turns phenomenology
in an existential direction and claims to account for our deepest
responsibilities as human beings.
Levinas and Jonas, however, write from an even graver
disappointment with how their teacher, Heidegger, exploits
phenomenology. Though each acclaims Being and Time as a masterpiece,
each condemns their mentor for portraying a self-centered existence
that pivots around the individual’s anxiety in the face of freedomunto-death.
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And each diagnoses Heidegger's fundamental ontology as

symptomatic of a larger cultural crisis in which the human will is
regarded as the creative ground of all moral value. Each contends that
what gets lost in Heidegger - and, at the very least, in modern
philosophy in general - is the way our existence is oriented by our
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obligation to a Good-in-itself that commands us from beyond our
humanity. And each traces this transcendent Good to the God of Abraham,
Isaac and Jacob. In this respect, each finds in Judaism the resources
to respond to the spirit of nihilism embodied by Heidegger’s thought.
Levinas and Jonas, however, find it incumbent on themselves as
philosophers not to ground ethics in dogmatic faith. And neither
believes he has to, for each argues that the Good is accessible to
human experience through creation. Consequently, one does not need to
be a Jew or consult Torah - or even believe in God’s existence or
interpet the world as creation - in order to be held responsible before
the tribunal of the Good. Though Torah is the medium of Judaic faith in
its particularity, the ethical message of Judaism is universally
available in the meaning that our existence reveals on its own terms.
God, one might say, has created the world in such a way that the moral
law and our capacity to receive it are part of the immanent structure
of creation.
The glaring difference between Levinas and Jonas lies in where
they place the Good in creation, and how they explain the relationship
between the Good and God. I propose to imagine the steps in a dialogue
between Levinas and Jonas, who, so far as I know, never engaged
eachother in person or writing after their student years in Weimar
Germany. Because both are formidable thinkers, I must introduce each in
his own right before the dialogue can begin.
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I. Levinas: Jerusalem and Athens

Levinas accuses the entire history of Western ontology “from
Parmenides on” of being driven by the urge to bring Being under the
command of the thinking self, so that the "Other" (or "Infinite") can
be corralled within the horizon of the ego’s own cares and
possibilities.
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This sweeping indictment permits Levinas to draw a stark

contrast between two roads in Western thought: 1) an avenue originating
in Athens - the egoism of ontology, with its penchant for a
"totalizing" grasp of Being - and 2) a path, emanating from Jerusalem,
that is less travelled by philosophers and that Levinas calls
“metaphysics.”

3

Following Rosenzweig and Heidegger, Levinas sees modern

philosophy not as decisively breaking from ancient Greek thought, but
as completing a rationalism that was already at work in Athens. But
against Heidegger, who traces that rationalism to Plato's "metaphysics
of presence" and tries in his later work to recover the meaning of
Being by turning to pre-Socratic ontology, Levinas joins Rosenzweig in
bidding us to walk the path towards Jerusalem before heading for
Athens.
The heart’s desire of the Jerusalemite, the metaphysician, is not
to think Being but to be ethically responsible for the Other, whose
very face is received as the locus of God’s commandment, “Thou shalt
not murder.” The face is a vessel of the Torah’s prophetic call to give
to “the orphan, the widow, the stranger and the poor.” The quality of
our lives is measured, in Levinas’s Judaic tradition, not by our
knowledge or authenticity, but by the attention we pay to these
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“Others”: the needy whose cries are inconvenient and whose lives may
seem useless to those intent on comprehending Being.
But what has Levinas’s move from Being to “the Other” to do with
philosophy? Doesn’t pitting Jerusalem against Athens, metaphysics
against ontology, also mean pitting faith against philosophy,
revelation against reason? Levinas answers "No!," contending that
Judaism's message does not require submission to the texts or laws of
the Jewish tradition in particular, but is immediately available to
every human being in what the human face-to-face encounter reveals on
its own terms. And this encounter can be articulated philosophically.
Worldly things derive their meaning from the roles they play
within a context organized around the cognitive powers and practical
needs of the ego. Knowing, using and enjoying things in one's
environment involve “assimilating” what is alien to "the Same." The
Other, however, has absolute meaning “all by himself,” prior to how he
fits into the ego’s grasp of Being. When the face is encountered for
what it is, Levinas says, the inexhaustibility of what it signifies the Other - is welcomed as a Good-in-itself for whom I am responsible.
This transcendent Good is acknowledged in its “Infinity,” as coming
from “beyond Being,” neither in a Platonic intellectual intuition nor
in a Heideggerian mood of anxiety, but in the feeling of shame that
attests to the awakening of one’s conscience before the Other. Levinas
writes:

Conscience... is the revelation of a resistance to my powers that
does not counter them as a greater force, but calls into question
the naive right of my powers, my glorious spontaneity as a living
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being. Morality begins when freedom, instead of being justified
by

itself, feels itself to be arbitrary and violent... The Other is
not initially a fact, is not an obstacle, does not threaten me
with death; he is desired in my shame.
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Levinas’s key idea is that the Other is not just an alter ego,
for if he were, then our relationship would be symmetrical: I would be
another You, and You another I. Levinas goes beyond Martin Buber’s
account of the I/Thou relationship by insisting that I am more
responsible for you than you are for yourself, and that my
responsibility for you is not contingent upon your mutuality.
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You

approach me from a height. You face me immediately, before I face
myself. I only face myself - to the extent that I ever do - when I step
back in reflection, but by that time I have already been claimed by the
commandment to serve your good. Here’s how Levinas puts it:

The Other is higher than I am because the first word of the face
is “Thou shalt not murder.” It is an order. There is a
commandment
to me.

in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke
However, at the same time the face of the Other is

destitute; it
all. I,

is the poor for whom I can do all and to whom I owe

whoever I may be, as the “first person,” I am he who finds

the

resources to respond to the call. The mastery of the Other and

his

poverty, with my submission and my wealth... are presupposed in
all human relationships. If it were not, then we would not even
say, before an open door, “After you, Sir!” It is an original
“After you, Sir!” that I have tried to describe.

6
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Ethics can only get a foothold in our lives, Levinas insists, if
we can overcome our natural temptation to "look out for old number
one." He notes:

There is a Jewish proverb which states that ‘the other’s
material needs are my spiritual needs’: it is this
disproportion, or asymmetry, that characterizes the ethical
refusal of the first truth of ontology - the struggle to be.
Ethics is, therefore, against nature because it forbids the
murderousness of my natural will to put my own existence first.
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Each organism orders its world around its own survival and prosperity
and is, at bottom, states Levinas, “hateful” of others.
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Life on its own

terms is a war of all against all. Even that sublime accomplishment of
the cogito - ontology - is, by Levinas’s rendering, just a
sophisticated means by which we humans express our conatus essendi our animal will-to-live - by mastering what is around us. Levinas goes
so far as to associate Heidegger's fundamental ontology with Darwin's
account of the life-world.

Heidegger says at the beginning of Being and Time that Dasein is
a

being who is concerned for this being itself. That's Darwin's
idea: the living being struggles for life. The aim of being is
being itself.

9
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Within nature, there are subjective goods, but no objective Good-initself, says Levinas, and so no basis for ethical responsibility.
Consequently, the very possibility of ethics demands reference to
a supernatural Good: a meaning that reveals itself from “beyond Being”
because it requires one to be able to sacrifice one's interests - and
even one’s life - for the sake of the Other. Regardless of whether one
identifies the Other’s face as the trace of God, one is responding to a
supernatural summons when one suppresses nature in order to welcome
one’s neighbor. Our bodies sets the stage for our being able to
transcend our nature and condemn “the survival of the fittest” in the
name of “Shalom!” And paradoxically, we reveal our spirituality most
fundamentally by tending to the material needs of others: the needs of
life itself.
Levinas agrees that the ethical message he discerns within the
I/You encounter is perhaps best exemplified by Jesus’s selfless
lovingkindness - and the Biblical paradigm of Levinasian neighborliness
is, I believe, the Good Samaritan. But Levinas interprets the Gospels
as conveying the same basic lesson that was already present in the
Prophets' injunction to give to “the orphan, the widow, the stranger
and the poor.” Still, Levinas’s emphasis on agape - one’s exclusive,
self-sacrificing exposure to the particular Other one happens to face seems to conflict with the Prophets’ ideal of justice: a moral
principle that requires that all Others, and even oneself, as “the
Other of Others,” be respected equally.
Levinas concedes that love needs justice, Jerusalem needs Athens,
because the “third parties” who stand outside the immediacy of the
I/You encounter are also one’s neighbors. Justice demands that
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incomparables be compared: that the unique Other to whom one is
absolutely devoted be placed within the wider human community and be
acknowledged as "only one among others.” Justice requires that the
conscientious self step back from the immediacy of the one-for-another
and adopt a posture of neutrality: treating everyone as having equal
rights. Levinas acknowedges that justice is recommended by the Torah
itself, but argues that ethical priority lies in mercy (rahamim):
simple acts of generosity. Long before the recently celebrated debate
between Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan over the relative
importance of justice and care, the Judaic tradition has known that a
concern with justice’s “abstract order of rules” too easily degenerates
into an “ideological rationalism” that is forgetful of the unique Other
who needs a helping hand.
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It should come as no surprise to us now that Levinas reads the
encounter with God - one’s submission before the majesty of the Other
who commands from “on high” - into the phenomenology of the interhuman
relationship itself. In presenting itself as coming from beyond the
world organized around one’s own, and even society’s, needs, the face
of the Other person is the “trace” of the divine. Metaphysics, in
Levinas’s sense, is ethics because the Good-in-itself is revealed in
the experience of one-for-another. And ethics, in turn, is already
religion: because proximity to God can arise only through devotion to
the other person. The transcendent is an immanent moment of the ethical
relation itself. The personal presence of God resides in the I/You
encounter, and love of God resides in love of neighbor.
But isn’t faith something above and beyond morality? Levinas
relates an anecdote told by Hannah Arendt shortly before her death.
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“When she was a child in her native Konigsberg, one day she said to the
rabbi who was teaching her religion: “You know, I have lost my faith.”
And the rabbi responded: “Who’s asking for it?”” Levinas remarks:

[T]he response was typical. What matters is not ‘faith,’ but
‘doing.’... [A]re believing and doing different things? What does
believing mean? What is faith made of? Words, ideas? Convictions?
What do we believe with? With the whole body! With all my bones.
(Psalm 35:10) What the rabbi meant was: “Doing good is the act of
belief itself.” That is my conclusion.
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Levinas concedes that the Christian idea of God’s kenosis - the
humility of God’s willingness “to live and die for all men” by
appearing on earth as the suffering servant of the vulnerable - is
“close to the Jewish sensibility.”

12

But he rejects the theological

concepts of transubstantiation and the Eucharist that come to surround
the personality of Jesus. Indeed, "theo-logy" - with its “Greek” root
in the desire to comprehend God’s nature, the nature of perfect
substance - is a kind of idolatry: the exercise of “the spiritually
refined” who, in the telling words of Isaiah 58, want to see the face
of God and enjoy His proximity before they have freed their slaves and
fed their hungry. Theology's focus on the epistemic issue of whether
faith is credible distracts us from Judaism's ethical message: that
belief lies in mitzvot, the performance of good works.
Levinas’s account of how God presents Himself, as forever absent,
through the face of the other person - captures three crucial features
of the Judaic idea of God. First, God is infinitely Other. It would be
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idolatry to believe that one can grasp Him in a finite image. Divine
incarnation is foreign to Judaic spirituality. Yahweh - He whose face
no human can look upon and survive - has abdicated us out of trust in
our ability to hear Him from afar. Second, in His infinite separation
from us, God nonetheless remains present, for His law is revealed
through the face of the Other. To compensate for His separation from
us, God has put Torah into his childrens’ hands, and, writes Levinas,
“one is justified in loving Torah even more than God.” It is the glory
of Judaism, according to Levinas, to welcome a God who does not want to
possess us but who wants us to be responsible so that our work has real
importance. “To veil His face in order to demand everything from man”:
this, remarks Levinas, is “an austere humanism bound to a difficult
adoration.”
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Finally, Levinas’s is a personal God who singles each of

us out for responsibility. We stand alone not, as Heidegger would have
it, before our own death, but in the irreplaceable burden we bear for
those whose lives embody a Good-in-itself that absolutely transcends
our own life and death.
Levinas brings all humans into the orbit of Judaic experience
because the I/You encounter, constitutive of being a human agent, bears
pre-philosophical and even pre-textual testimony to the Judaic
understanding of the relationship between humanity and God. “Thou shalt
not murder” is, as Levinas puts it, “a Saying that is prior to any
14

Said” : an imperative addressed to the singular individual, through the
face of the Other, that precedes all products of tradition or
reflection, including ontological accounts of the meaning of Being.
Though commandment takes possession of the ego before one has time to
reflect on it, our reason can articulate the meaning of this experience
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by a phenomenological description of the revelation implicit in the
face-to-face encounter. In this regard, then, faith is not alien to
philosophy, revelation not immune to reason.
Against Heidegger in particular, who represents the apotheosis of
the egoism of ontology, Levinas uses phenomenology to establish that no
anxious assertion of freedom can excuse a shameful failure of ethical
responsibility, no appeal to authenticity can override the commandment
not to murder, and that any philosophy, like Heidegger’s, that cannot
set this fundamental limit is complicit in the Nazis’ crime against the
Absolute.
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II. Jonas: Athens and Jerusalem

The route to a Judaic moment in Hans Jonas’s philosophy is far
more circuitous. Jonas’s work does not spring from an alleged
opposition between Athens and Jerusalem. He unabashedly pursues
ontology’s project of trying to comprehend the meaning of Being. What
worries Jonas about modern philosophy in general and Heidegger’s
thought in particular is not the spirit of ontology as such, but the
ontological assumption of dualism: of a stark divide between human
beings and the rest of nature. The greatest flaw in Heidegger’s
fundamental ontology, according to Jonas, is not that he forgets “the
Other,” but that he diminishes Being by denying that living nature is a
Good-in-itself: a meaningful whole to which we belong and which
commands our responsibility.
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Heidegger epitomizes the nihilistic temper of modernity. No
longer believing that humanity belongs to a sacred order of creation or
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“an objective order of essences in the totality of nature,” moderns
have lost not only the grounds for cosmic piety, but also a stable
image of human nature, even the conviction that we have a nature. Jonas
writes:

That nature does not care one way or the other is the true abyss.
That only man cares, in his finitude facing nothing but death,
alone with his contingency and the objective meaninglessness of
his projecting meanings, is a truly unprecedented situation...
There is no point in caring for what has no sanction behind
it in any creative intention.
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Existentialism is no idiosyncracy within modern thought,
according to Jonas, but the most complete expression of “the ethical
vacuum” caused by two key assumptions of the modern credo: 1) that the
idea of obligation is a human invention, not a discovery based on the
objective reality of the Good-in-itself; and 2) that the rest of Being
is indifferent to our experience of obligation.
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Jonas challenges these

modern assumptions and aims to disclose, in a manner consistent with
modern science, "a principle of ethics which is ultimately grounded
neither in the authority of the self nor in the needs of the community,
but in an objective assignment by the nature of things."

19

Jonas’s

recovery of the meaning of Being unfolds in three stages: existential,
ontological, and theological. Our journey through the first two stages
will be brief as I have been asked to focus on the Judaic dimension of
Jonas's thought.

20

My main object is to track how Jonas relates the
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Good-in-itself - the ultimate object of our ethical responsibility - to
his Judaic God.
In The Phenomenon of Life, Jonas offers "an existential
interpretation of biological facts," arguing that "concern for one's
being" is not reserved for Dasein alone, but is present in "an
ascending scale" of perception and action among plants, animals and
human beings. Value is inherent in nature because organisms must be
able to experience value and disvalue in order to survive and thrive.
Jonas worries, however, that a “nihilist” may acknowledge the presence
of subjective value in Being yet doubt “whether the whole toilsome and
terrible drama is worth the trouble.”
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In The Imperative of Responsibility, Jonas seeks to demonstrate
the objective reality of value - a Good-in-itself - because only from
it can a binding obligation to guard Being be derived. On the basis of
“intuitive certainty,” Jonas derives “the ontological axiom” that the
goodness of life is not relative to already existing purposes, for “the
very capacity to have purposes at all is a good-in-itself.”

22

Through

life, Being says “Yes” to itself. Only humans, however, are able to
discern the ontological truth: that the presence of life in Being is
“absolutely and infinitely” better than its absence. The ethical
consequence of this axiom is that we have a duty to protect the lifeworld. But not all living things have equal ethical status. The primary
object of our responsibility within the Good-in-itself of living
nature, Jonas contends, is "the idea of Man" and so the future of
humanity. This is no anthropocentric conceit but an objective
assignment by Being, for the testimony of life justifies our seeing
ourselves, in our capacities for knowledge, freedom and responsibility,
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as "a 'coming to itself' of original substance," the actualization of a
"cosmogonic Eros."
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Finally, we arrive at the theological - and, specifically, Judaic
- stage of Jonas’s thought. Having located the Good-in-itself within
Being, what need is there for belief in God? Jonas concedes that
neither his existential interpretation of the biological facts nor his
ontological grounding of an imperative of responsibility demands that
we see living nature as God’s creation. But they do not rule it out
either, so long as our appreciation of the meaning of Being is
compatible with faith. Jonas contends that although we can make ethical
sense of our place in nature without appealing to a transcendent
Creator, we can also make sense of nature - and perhaps deepen its
meaning - by thinking of it as God’s creation.
Jonas proceeds from the premise that those who live from the
Judaic tradition believe that nature is the work of a supreme Creator,
and then asks whether this concept of God can accommodate four aspects
of modern belief that our reason cannot deny: 1) the denial of personal
immortality, given the evidence that mind depends on body and so death
brings an end to both; 2) the brute reality of evil, ineradicably
symbolized by Auschwitz; 3) modern science’s exclusion of divine
intervention from the explanation of nature; and 4) modern cosmology’s
evidence that the universe began with “the big bang” and that life is a
late, rare, and precarious product of nature’s labors. Jonas concludes
that Judaic faith in the goodness of a God who created the universe and
revealed Himself to uniquely elected individuals remains a genuine
option today even for those who refuse to turn their backs on what
reason commends to them.
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Jonas begins his theological journey by suggesting that we can
accept a central article of modern reason - the denial of personal
immortality - while finding some meaning in the idea of immortality
itself.

24

He draws on two Judaic symbols - "the Book of Life" and "the

transcendent image of God" - to develop the idea that our decisions
carry eternal significance. Hebrew prayer speaks of our names being
inscribed in "the Book of life" according to our individual deserts.
The deeds we add to this record, on Jonas's interpretation, bear not on
any future destiny of ours as individuals but on the welfare of God who
harbors a unified memory of the world-process. Our experience of the
call of conscience in the moment of decision attests to our holding the
fate of "the becoming deity" in our hands, for the completion of His
image depends on our fulfilling the promise of goodness that His gift
of life offers us.
Jonas goes so far as to argue for the existence of a such a God,
who experiences the particular events of history as they occur and
weaves them into an ever-growing memory so that the truth about the
past is eternally preserved, although He lacks both a foreknowledge of
what will occur and the power to physically alter the course of
affairs. Jonas contends that our consciousness as finite, historical
beings depends upon our awareness of a distinction between true and
false statements about the past. And this distinction in turn must
refer to a universal and perfect mind for whom the past remains
eternally present, for our hold on the long-lost past at best
represents what seems true to us based on current evidence.
Our reconstruction of natural history rests on the unprovable
assumption that nature's laws remain the same over time: that
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contingency plays no role in their evolution. And our opinions about
human history stand vulnerable to distorted evidence, the most extreme
instance of which is the totalitarian effort to rewrite the historical
archive. Jonas recounts a conversation with Hannah Arendt in which they
imagined that Stalin had succeeded in revising the Soviet historical
record to the point where there was no way for future generations to
know about the Gulags. Our awareness that statements which meet our
evidential standards of "historical" truth may be incorrigibly false
attests to our recognition that the concept of truth about the past
refers to a perspective that infinitely transcends our own. And,
following Descartes's causal argument, Jonas conjectures that our idea
of such a mind must have been caused by that mind itself.

25

Jonas agrees with Kant that theological arguments never comprise
proofs, but reason must still venture such speculations in order to
address two spiritual longings. First, we may hope that the unavoidable
question, "How did it all begin?," find an answer in a personal ground:
a caring presence who created the world with the intention of letting
creatures arise in its midst who are able to respond to the goodness of
Being. Second, we may hope that nothing good be lost and forgotten:
that there be an eternal memory even of "the gassed and burnt children
of Auschwitz, the defaced, dehumanized victims of the camps, and all
the other numberless victims of holocausts of our time."

26

No immanent

ontology of nature can satisfy these spiritual longings. Yet they are
just what the Jewish God answers, symbolized as He is by "the Book of
Life" and "the transcendent image."
Jonas then proposes a more "complete metaphysics" into which such
symbols would fit. He invents “a tentative myth” that more fully
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articulates God's nature and shows the compatibility between reason and
faith. He imagines that God withdraws from His own creation in order
that the world might be “for itself,” fraught with risk. God - utterly
exhausted by his creative effort and with nothing left to give pronounces His experiment to be good only with the long awaited, but
not inevitable, emergence of life: of creatures who affirm their own
existence. Prior to the advent of knowledge, however, God’s cause
cannot go wrong because life retains its innocence. Eventually, with
the evolution of humanity, life arrives at the highest intensification
of its own value, for our capacities for knowledge and freedom
represent “transcendence awakened to itself.”
But there is a price to be paid, for with knowledge and freedom
come the power to will and do evil: an unprecedented power in this
technological age, given our ability to destroy our species. Still,
moral responsibility is the mark of our being made “for” God’s image,
not “in” it. Among earthly creatures only we can acknowledge the
transcendent importance of our deeds: that we are the “mortal trustees
of an immortal cause.” To God’s self-limitation we owe thanks, for this
makes room for us to help Him by taking responsibility for our own
vulnerable affairs. We are called “to mend the world” for the sake of a
caring, suffering and becoming God who is powerless to realize the
promise of His creation on His own.

27

Jonas’s myth lets him accommodate a second truth that reason
cannot deny: evil is real. A Jew cannot avoid asking: how could the
Lord of history - who responds to worldly events with “a mighty hand
and an outstretched arm” - have allowed the Holocaust to happen? It
would be a curse on God to believe that divine goodness renders the
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evil of mass murder a mere illusion of our finite perspective. Jonas’s
myth incorporates the speculation that God was silent not because He
chose not to intervene but because He could not have intervened. God
remains impotent in the physical realm, but addresses us through the
manifest goodness of creation itself with “the mutely insistent appeal
of his unfulfilled goal.”
Jonas concedes that his myth of a God who spent Himself in the
labor of creation “strays far from the oldest Jewish teaching.” But he
believes that the traditional theological notion of God’s omnipotence
must be sacrificed to protect His goodness, and he finds precedent for
his idea of a self-limiting God in the teaching of the Lurianic
Kabbalah regarding tzimtzum, or divine self-contraction. He receives
further confirmation in the diary of Etty Hillesum, a Dutch Jewess who
volunteered for the Westerbork concentration camp in order “to help in
the hospital and share in the fate of her people.” The basis for her
martyrdom lay in her conviction that God “cannot help us,” but it is
our turn to give back: to “help You and defend Your dwelling-place in
us to the last.”
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But can such a God meet the third dictate of reason: the
scientific exclusion of divine intervention from the explanation of
nature? Here again Jonas’s tzimtzum myth again comes to the rescue.
Divine agency, of which revealed religion must speak, need not be
represented in the form of visible, spectacular miracles that violate
nature’s laws. Instead, it can involve the direct inspiration of
uniquely elected individuals. For if we can accept the compatibility
between causality and freedom in the case of human action - and Jonas
thinks we must - then we can permit a similar compatibility in the case
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of divine action. As laws of nature do not preclude freedom in our
acting upon the external world, so the principles of psychology do not
block entry to a transcendent initiative in our inner lives. In this
respect, Jews have an advantage over Christians, Jonas contends, for
while the counternatural miracles of Jesus’s birth, resurrection and
ascension touch upon the core of Christian faith, “nothing much hangs
on [such] miracles in the Old Testament.”

29

The fourth demand of reason - the evidence of modern cosmology again finds support in Jonas’s myth. For it is plausible to read the
cosmological evidence as pointing to a physically improbable, antientropic development from chaos to order: from simpler, commonplace
concatenations of matter to more complex, unusual forms of life. Life
itself appears to be late and rare in the universe, but far rarer is
that most inward and self-transcending product of life: the human mind.
Jonas speculates that the upward mobility of the evolutionary record though “no guaranteed success-story” - lends credibility to the idea
that the cause of the universe was not random.

30

Still, the fate of the

divine adventure lies with us, for only we can bear witness to the
three pillars of the Judaic faith: 1) that God saw His creation was a
Good-in-itself; 2) that God created humanity for His own image; and 3)
that God made known to humanity what is good because His word is
inscribed in our hearts.

31

Though Jonas’s “imperative of responsibility” - never to let the
existence or essence of humanity be threatened by the hazards of action
- follows from Judaism’s appreciation of the goodness of life and the
special dignity of humanity, he contends that this imperative is
available to reasonable people everywhere, even atheists who do not
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interpret nature as God’s creation. Our duty to be “executors of an
estate that only we can see but did not create”

32

is founded, Jonas

insists, on a judgment concerning the value of life “that can be
separated from any thesis concerning [the world’s] authorship."

33

The

presupposition of a Creator would offer us no reason for judging the
world to be good if the world did not justify our perception of its
value in its own right. The person of faith should believe not that
creation is good because God created it, but that God created it
because He recognized life as a Good-in-itself and morally responsible
life as the highest evolution of the Good. But this means that theistic
- and in particular Judaic - faith, though compatible with an
understanding of nature that commands our responsibility, is not
necessary for such an understanding. Furthermore, although faith in
revelation need not conflict with science, it is safer to keep ethics
in the public realm independent of revealed truth because of the
arrogance and dogmatism invited by the claim that one possesses "the
one true religion" and also because religious ethics will fail to win
broad support in an era of declining faith.
Hans Jonas grounds ethics ontologically in “the depths of Being.”
Whereas Heidegger tries to persuade us of a silent call of conscience
commanding us to be authentic in the face of the nothingness of Being,
Jonas alerts us to an ethical imperative emanating from the plenitude
of Being. Herein lies the meaning of Jonas’s pointedly antiHeideggerian motto: “Responsibility is the moral complement to the
ontological constitution of our temporality.”
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The plenitude of Being

opens up “a genuine present” because it gives us a future worth caring

21
for: a future that is already present in the integrity of nature, both
outside ourselves and within.

III. Dialogue

Although both Levinas and Jonas draw from their roots in Judaism
and phenomenology to fill an ethical vacuum, epitomized by Heidegger's
fundamental ontology, that haunts the Western philosophical tradition,
it is hard to find common ground for dialogue between them, for their
their ideas are couched in different languages and fundamental
categories. Though both aim to ground an imperative of responsibility
in a Good-in-itself ultimately anchored in God, their disagreements
would seem to be so basic as to allow for no hope of rapprochement.
These disagreements revolve around three fundamental questions:

A) Can Jews today have a theology without lapsing into theodicy?
B) Is the Good-in-Itself "Otherwise than Being" or within Being?
C) Is ethics against nature or the completion of nature?

A. Can Jews Have a Theology without Theodicy?

Levinas would surely object that Jonas’s whole approach to God
places Athens ahead of Jerusalem, onto-theology over commandment, the
issue of faith before the requirements of mitzvot. What Jonas takes to
be a premise of Judaic faith - that God created the universe - drives
him to ask the traditional question of rational theology: what
attributes must we take the Creator of the universe to have, consistent
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with what we know from our experience of creation? Given that God’s
goodness is the perfection most central to Judaic faith, Jonas
concludes that we can only attribute goodness to God by limiting His
power and foreknowledge. Having shown what the Creator's nature must be
if He is worthy of our faith, Jonas even offers several arguments for
God's existence.
From Levinas’s perspective, Jonas subordinates the living God of
Torah and Talmud to the God of philosophers steeped in Greek ontology.
Of this difference Levinas states:

The God of the Bible cannot be defined or proved by means of
logical predications and attributions. Even the superlatives of
wisdom, power and causality advanced by medieval ontology are
inadequate to the absolute otherness of God. It is not by
superlatives that we can think of God but by trying to identify
the particular interhuman events that open towards transcendence
and reveal the traces where God has passed. The God of ethical
philosophy is not “God the almighty being of creation,” but the
persecuted God of the prophets who is always in relation to
man...
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Why does Levinas insist that we can't have both the God of
ethical philosophy and the God of rational theology: both "the Other"
and the "almighty being of creation"? I think it is because he
identifies rational theology with theodicy, and concludes that the
death of this God, pronounced by Nietzsche, has "taken on the meaning
of a quasi-empirical fact" given the horrors of the twentieth century.
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The rational theologian, ensnared in the logic of trying to comprehend
the height of the Supreme Being in terms of what it means to be
perfectly, is seduced by "the temptation of theodicy" - the fantasy
that:

[T]he evil that fills the earth would be explained by a "grand
design"; it would be destined to the atonement of a sin, or
announce, to the ontologically limited consciousness,
compensation
sensible
that

or recompense at the end of time. These superperspectives are invoked in order to divine, in a suffering

is essentially gratuitous and absurd, and apparently arbitrary, a
meaning and order.
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Although all religion prior to the twentieth century begins with the
promise of salvation, according to Levinas, Auschwitz requires us
either to abandon God or else obey the moral law independently of the
Happy Ending, preach piety without reward, imagine that conscience
brings us closer to God "in a more difficult, but also a more
spiritual, way than does confidence in any kind of theodicy."

38

In keeping with halakhic Judaism, Levinas says a Jew today must
make sense of suffering ethically, not by way of rational theology.

39

Useless suffering is evil. Insofar as one suffers "for nothing," one
suffers not only from something but from suffering itself.

Yet evil

can gain ethical-religious meaning from compassion: when one makes
one's own suffering into suffering for the suffering of others. The
only compensation for useless suffering is the occasion it provides for
responsibility: for taking on, as one's own, the affliction of another.
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But this elevation of the Other neither makes his suffering "for
something" by giving it a purpose, nor brings satisfaction to the
righteous one, for responsibility requires that one feel ever more
accused and take on more and more affliction.
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Levinas enjoins us to rethink the meaning of Jerusalem as "ethics
without salvation": being-for-the-Other even at the expense of my own
desire to be. "To be worthy of the messianic era," Levinas writes, "one
must admit that ethics has a meaning even without the promises of the
Messiah."
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Such an ethics - obedient to "an un-known God who does not

assume a body and is open to atheism's denials"
theology without theodicy."

43

42

- is tantamount to "a

The Good-in-itself does not console us but

intensifies the burden of responsibility, and the good life is a
stranger to all rewards except the elevation of the soul's dignity. In
the spirit of Emil Fackenheim, Levinas states that "faith is not a
question of the existence or non-existence of God," but of choosing to
accept the authority of morality even "after the failure of morality."
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To Levinas's claim that "the God of ethical philosophy is not
'God the almighty being of creation,' but the persecuted God of the
prophets who is always in relation to man...," Hans Jonas would no
doubt reply that the Creator is always in relation to man - as the
caring, but now powerless “Ground of Being” who suffers when we fail to
shoulder our responsibilities - but that Jews cannot bypass rational
theology because the idea of the Creator is the central premise of
Torah, and reason's interest in thinking to its very limits cannot be
denied. Jonas would agree with Levinas that the central task of Jewish
philosophy after Auschwitz is to speak of a God worthy of our faith
because He is not responsible for suffering or the evils of history.
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But Jonas undertakes this task in an unflinchingly theological way,
denying that rational theology must lapse into theodicy.
Jonas's appeal to tzimtzum - the Kabbalic idea of the selfcontracting God - lets him symbolize a caring, suffering and becoming
Creator for whom cosmic and human history is no guaranteed story of
progress. Jonas's Supreme Being does not eliminate the reality of evil,
lessen the burden of our responsibility, or diminish the sense in which
we ought to assume our obligations towards creation ultimately for the
sake of the Other, God, whose transcendent image it is ours to
complete. There are, to be sure, elements of consolation in Jonas's
theology: in particular, the thought that everything good is remembered
for all eternity. But whatever salvation this offers does not come by
way of personal immortality or belief in inevitable progress.
Though Jonas agrees with Nietzsche, Heidegger and Levinas that
the God of theology-as-theodicy is dead, he concurs with Levinas that
the later Heidegger's alternative of a non-objectifying listening to
the call of Being amounts to a pagan deification of the world: a
natural theology in which the divine does not transcend but belongs to
Being.
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But Jonas disagrees with Levinas about what it takes to think

God's transcendence, contending that the theologian is beholden to
objectifying thought and language, even though this objectification
inevitably fails to do justice to the divine.
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Against Levinas's turn

"beyond Being" to the Other, Jonas takes rational theology, regarding
both God's existence and essence, to be a legitimate Jewish enterprise.
The real task is "how to keep the necessary inadequacy of theological
language transparent for what is to be indicated by it."
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Jonas rejects the theological strategy of his teacher, Rudolf
Bultmann: de-mythologization. Bultmann would have us translate mythical
terms into the terms of existential philosophy so that objective
concepts - like "God" - would return to their origin in the selfexperience of human beings. For his part, Jonas contends that the
understanding of God should not be reduced to the self-understanding of
man. The paradoxical sphere of divinity, he states, is better protected
by myth, whose manifest opacity remains transparent for the ineffable
and mysterious God, than by concepts grounded in the self-experience of
man.
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Rational theology must take its cue from myths that:

[may] happen to adumbrate a truth which of necessity is
unknowable
intimations
of giving
images.

and even, in direct concepts, ineffable, yet which, by
to our deepest experience, lays claim upon our powers
indirect accounts of it in revocable, anthropomorphic
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The myth of tzimtzum invites theology-without-theodicy, according
to Jonas, for God can be imagined "objectively" without our concluding
that everything in creation expresses His will and power. Though
suffering in general is the price of creation's independence from the
Creator, no particular moment of suffering - and in particular, no
human act of evil - must be for some higher purpose. Evil is real
because people often suffer for nothing. Still, faith in God's
existence, though it cannot be proven, is compatible with what reason
recommends to us, and is even a plausible hypothesis given the
unlikelihood, according to Jonas, of mind having evolved from what is
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mindless. If God does exist, we must argue for the finitude of His
power: the priority of the Good over His will. One diminishes the
divine mystery by presuming that the Creator is omniscient or
omnipotent.
So maybe a rapprochement between Levinas and Jonas is possible
after all. They agree that suffering and evil are real, and the God of
theodicy dead. After Auschwitz we must conclude that there is no good
reason, purpose or compensation for much of the affliction that befalls
the creatures of God's world. Theodicy makes a mockery of God. So we
have the glimmer of a synthesis: perhaps the goodness of Jonas's nowimpotent Creator reveals itself in Levinas's "face of the other person"
whose dignity commands my responsibility. Levinas's halakhic response
to the problem of evil seems to open the possibility of a
reconciliation with Jonas's employment of the Kabbalic myth of
tzimtzum.

B. Is the Good Within Being or "Otherwise than Being"?

A tantalizing prospect of synthesis, but far too hasty. For Jonas
would object that Levinas, in refusing to conceive of God theologically
as the author of nature, distances himself from another article of
Judaic faith: the inherent goodness of life. By imagining God only as
the ultimate Other of the interhuman ethical relation, Levinas severs
God from nature: the Other from Being.
Recall that, on Jonas's myth, the emergence of life justifies
God's judgment that His creation is a Good-in-itself, for life says
"Yes!" to Being. With the advent of human knowledge and freedom, this
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goodness is entrusted to man "to be completed, saved or spoiled by what
he will do to himself and the world." Our primary ethical
responsibility, however, is towards the Idea or essence of humanity in
which each of us participates, for our form of life represents the
highest actualization of Being's purposiveness, and so it is a matter
of ontological import that we safeguard the future of our kind. By
Jonas's lights, Levinas misconstrues the object of our responsibility
by locating it "beyond Being," thus leaving out the ethical resources
of the life-world from which we evolved and on which we depend, and
favoring the particular Other person over the universal of humanity in
which we share and which grounds our responsibility for future
generations.
Levinas would retort that Jonas is mistaken to locate the Good
within Being. First, Jonas's God has become ethically irrelevant
because his Good-in-itself has ontological standing independent of God.
Second,

nature is incapable of supporting ethics, according to

Levinas, for nature, stripped of any reference to the Other who
commands the self from “beyond Being,” is the site of egoism: the drive
of each living thing to organize the world around its own needs.
Levinas’s divide between Being and the Other is rooted in a major
premise: that Being - the totality of nature - includes value only from
the egoistic perspective of organisms willing their own survival and
prosperity. Ethics can open up, Levinas insists, only if "there is a
rupture with Being's own law: the law of evil"
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- if, that is, I am

available to an "otherwise than Being" who calls me to transcend my
natural self. He states:
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With the appearance of the human - and this is my entire
philosophy - there is something more important than my life, and
that is the life of the Other. That is unreasonable. Man is an
unreasonable animal. Most of the time my life is dearer to me;
most of the time one looks after oneself. But we cannot not
admire

saintliness.
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The human is a radically new phenomenon for it breaks with pure Being's
struggle for life which is ultimately "a question of might."
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Jonas rejects Levinas’s dualistic - even "Gnostic" - premise that
nature contains no Good-in-itself. But perhaps we have a second
opportunity for rapprochement, for Levinas concedes, upon being asked
whether animals should be considered as Others, that "the ethical
extends to all living beings," and he poignantly acknowledges the
possibility of "a transcendence in the animal." He recounts the story
of Bobby, a dog who found his way into Levinas's prisoner-of-war unit
and faithfully befriended the captives who had become a subhuman "gang
of apes" for both the guards and local citizens who passed them by.
Levinas remarks that for Bobby "there was no doubt we were men," and he
crowns the dog "the last Kantian in Nazi Germany," even if Bobby lacked
"the brain needed to universalize maxims and inclinations."
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So

perhaps, even for Levinas, ethics is more implicated in nature, the
Good more internal to Being, than his opposition between Being and the
Other would have us think.

C. Is Ethics Against Nature or the Completion of Nature?
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Again, however, peace is not so quickly at hand, for Levinas
insists that we think ethics against nature, while Jonas grounds the
imperative of responsibility in his ontological naturalism. Jonas would
identify two pitfalls in Levinas's rejection of naturalism. First, if
all of nature is God’s creation and human life is a recent and rare
outcome of nature’s own evolution, it is odd to see our coming-intobeing as so discontinuous with the rest of the life-world. Levinas and
Jonas agree that only humans are ethical creatures subject to an
imperative emanating from the Good, but Jonas sees the capacity for
responsibility as a development of life’s inherent goodness, not an
external imposition of the Good upon life. Even if Levinas anecdotally
acknowledges capacities for responsiveness in non-human animals which
suggest that there is gradation and teleology within living nature, his
dualism of Being and the Other, Jonas would argue, deprives him of the
categories to do justice to his own insight.
Second, Levinas holds that the ethical encounter is asymmetrical
because an equal, mutual relationship between self and other is still
too tainted with selfish concern. “The ethical rapport with the
face...” is unnatural, he states, for I must “subordinate my existence
to the other.”
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Jonas, by contrast, locates the drama of our ethical

life within nature. On the one hand, we are inclined by nature to give
priority to the interests of family and friends. This is not wholly
selfish, for such special relationships of caring - especially between
parent and child - are often marked by generosity and genuine selfsacrifice. Against Levinas’s Hobbesian view of human nature, Jonas
offers a more Humean appreciation of our moral sentiments. On the other
hand, Jonas recognizes that if we simply follow our natural passions,
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sympathetic though they be, we will not be up to the task imposed by
his imperative of responsibility, for it requires a level of respect
for humanity and future generations that does not come naturally. This
is the Kantian moment in Jonas's idea of our ultimate obligation: the
requirement of suppressing our natural, present-centered inclinations
for the sake of our duty towards a distant future that will not serve
our own happiness.
Still, there remains a classical, Platonic/Aristotelean moment in
Jonas's ontological Grundlegung, for the Good in light of which we
ought to be moved by respect for "the Idea of man" is a natural one,
and we can come to feel that our commitment to it represents the
actualization of "cosmogonic Eros" and the fulfillment of our largest
self-concern, not the sacrifice of it for the Other’s sake. Jonas's
sense of justice is animated by the Platonic notion that all human
individuals share in the Form of humanity and that this Form is a
manifestation of the Good. In this regard, then, the cultivation of
virtues corresponding to Jonas's ethics for the future should be seen
as contributing to the eudaimonia of the person who embodies them.
From Levinas’s perspective, of course, this enlargement of selfconcern only betrays the extent to which Jonas has been seduced by
Athens - and Socrates’s erotic dream of realizing his own good by
assimilating himself to the Idea of justice through the exercise of
reason - rather than following the unreasonable path of Jerusalem which
commands us to be holy: to be moved by selfless love of the Other.
Levinas would be correct to call Jonas a "Greek" when it comes to
ethics, for Jonasian responsibility requires not the suppression of our
nature for the Other's sake but the completion of our nature in a pious
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appreciation of the organic whole to which we belong. But Jonas would
reject Levinas's judgement that one cannot be a Greek in ethics and a
Jew at the level of faith.
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IV. Rapprochement?

On the three fundamental questions we have explored -

A) Can

Jews today have a theology without lapsing into a discredited
theodicy?, B) Is the Good-in-Itself "Otherwise than Being" or within
Being?, and C) Is ethics against nature or the completion of nature? Levinas and Jonas appear to be at loggerheads. Levinas believes that
Jews must abandon conceiving of God onto-theologically and should
instead approach Him ethically - as "Otherwise than Being" - through
the face of the Other person, whose "height" commands me not to murder
and even to sacrifice, for his good alone, my natural desire to exist.
Jonas believes that there is and must be a place for theological
speculation in Judaism, but that we can intuit the Good-in-itself as
the first principle of Being and understand ethics as the completion of
nature, once we reject reductive materialism and appreciate nature
ontologically.
The deepest root of the ethical difference between our two Jewish
thinkers lies in where they locate the disease - the ethical vacuum for which the appeal to the Good provides the necessary therapy. For
Levinas, the disease inheres in human nature itself which, left to its
own devices, tends towards the worst. Levinas is haunted by a world he
has known all too well: in which the egoism underlying the social
contract has reared its head and made a mockery of the conventional
prohibition against murder. Unless murder is forbidden by an authority
higher than nature, he worries, no standard allows us to condemn
barbarity once the vulnerable cease to be protected by the social
contract. Levinas believes we must go further than those who provide an
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"enlightened" defense of individual rights based on the moral equality
of all persons. For the absolute moral worth of an individual can only
reveal itself when the face of the Other commands one from “beyond
nature” and “from a height,” and this command precedes the neutral,
impartial requirements of legal-political justice. “Thou shalt not
murder” is more heteronomous than any laws resulting from the neutral
posture of human autonomy or agreement.
Levinas would have us think that only love for the unique Other
enables us to break out of the prison of self-concern. For I go towards
God not by securing my place in Eternity but by giving it all up for
the Infinity of time. And this I can do by realizing the "possibility,
through sacrifice, of giving meaning to the Other and to the world
which, though without me, still counts for me, and for which I am
answerable."
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Only in fearing the death of the Other more than my own

am I truly open to "a future that will never be my present."
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For Levinas, the acid test of responsibility only occurs when,
for the good of the Other, I may have to pay an unreasonably high
price. The Holocaust would never have happened if individuals had
passed this test: if they had not only been able to acknowledge the
face of the Other beyond the stereotypes imposed by Nazi ideology, but
also been willing to jeopardize their own comfort and even survival for
these Others in spite of the fact that shutting them out conformed with
Nazi justice. But it was only natural to ask: Why should I take it upon
myself to break the law and thereby risk my family's safety in order to
save a public enemy whom it is acceptable, even required, to regard
with contempt?
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Jonas joins Levinas in believing that the liberal tradition of
individual rights (not to mention the anti-cosmopolitanism of
Heidegger) fails to meet the ethical challenge of our time. For Jonas,
too, the task of being our brother's keeper - tantamount to hearing the
outcry of the invisible, impotent deity - demands far more of us than
Biblical wisdom's liberal descendant - "Pursue your own happiness so
long as you do not violate the rights of others" - would have us think.
But for Jonas that challenge is to defend not the perennial figure of
the saint, but an image of the natural Good robust enough to ground our
responsibility towards future generations who, as not-yet-existent,
have no individual rights. No less acquainted than Levinas with the
depths to which human nature has sunk in his century, Jonas worries
that "the road to hell is paved with good intentions." If Hannah Arendt
awakens us to the idea that most of the evil in the age of
totalitarianism has stemmed not from wickedness but thoughtlessness the willingness of bureaucrats like Adolf Eichmann to do their jobs
without asking questions - Jonas is most concerned that our
technological prowess tempts us with “the bait of utopia”: the fantasy
that our ever-expanding power to “master and possess nature” can only
improve our lives.
Jonas worries that our hubris risks sacrificing the good for the
sake of the perfect. Unless nature itself - and our own nature - can be
shown to be a Good-in-itself, there is no standard that allows us to
set limits to what we might do in the name of bettering our condition,
both within ourselves and without, through the use of
psychopharmaceutical, genetic, and nuclear technologies, among others.
Jonas holds, therefore, that the dualistic belief, shared by Levinas,
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that nature harbors no Good-in-itself is nihilistic. For if nature
presents us with no ethical norms, then no effort to change our own
nature in the name of perfection, convenience or novelty could be
condemned as a transgression of essential limits or a violation of a
standard beyond any convention of our own making.
Yet let us not forget - and do we here have one last chance at
rapprochement? - that Jonas, like Levinas, is looking for a sense of
responsibility that will orient us towards a future that we will not be
there to experience. Though Jonas's imperative commands not love of the
unique Other but a kind of intergenerational justice, there is an
asymmetry in this justice, for it requires sacrificing not our lives
but our short-term interests for the sake of long-term benefits that we
- and even our childrens' children - will not enjoy. Future generations
will profit from what we bequeath to them, but we will not profit from
what they make of our bequest. This is the element of saintliness that
makes Jonas's imperative of responsibility so demanding. He, like
Levinas, sees that the task of ethics is to explain why I should care
about "a future without me." But while Levinas is obsessed by the
perennial issue of what it takes to rescue strangers in dire
circumstances, Jonas focuses on the novel question of what it will take
to protect conditions under which human individuals can flourish at
all. Perhaps these are two aspects of a single challenge after all.
But whose philosophy is more authentically Judaic: Jonas’s ontotheological naturalism or Levinas’s ethical supernaturalism? I leave
that as an open question. From a philosophical point-of-view, however,
the issue is irrelevant, for both thinkers claim that the Good commands
everyone: Jew and non-Jew alike. While Levinas holds that one only
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loves God by loving Other persons, Jonas claims, in effect, that one
only loves God by caring for humanity as the highest expression of
nature’s intrinsic majesty. They agree, however, that Yahweh is so
self-effacing that one can hear the commandment of the Good without
giving it the name of “Yahweh.” And this implies another piece of
common ground: that the self-effacing or self-limiting God leaves us
responsible to answer His prayer that we improve the world. God’s
creative power now lies not in His ability to intervene in the physical
world and guarantee that good prevails over evil, but in His everpresent capacity - through the Good - to inspire us to take His
commandment to heart.
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Levinas goes farther, rejecting Soloveitchik's
metaphysical problem altogether by refusing to conceive of
God in terms of predicates like knowledge, goodness and
power, for God's transcendence is signified not by the
theologian's Supreme Being who infinitely exceeds our
capacity for knowledge, but only by an "otherwise than
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Difference, Heidegger contends that "deity can come into philosophy
only insofar as philosophy, of its own accord and by its own nature,
requires and determines that and how the deity enters into it." (ID 56)
Theology becomes onto-theology when it capitulates to the demand of
calculative-representational thinking for reasons. The principle of
sufficient reason, as a demand for completeness, invites an appeal to
God as the ultimate ratio. But the mystery of Being gets reduced to
idolatry, Heidegger alleges, when divinity becomes a being that
revolves around man's need for reasons. The God of philosophy is
religiously useless, according to Heidegger, because "before the causa
sui man can neither pray nor sacrifice, neither fall to his knees in
awe nor play music and dance." (ID 56)
Though Levinas concurs with Heidegger that rational theology
assimilates the living God to the theoretical demands of ontology - and
ultimately the consolations of theodicy - Levinas would accuse
Heidegger of paganism: of deifying Being and altogether effacing God's
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[Levinas attacks Heidegger's effort to] restore a world dominated
by the mysterious powers of the sacred. Heidegger's "fourfold" is
too small to contain God, and when Heidegger, in his "Letter on
Humanism," declares that Being itself must take the initiative to
open for us the dimension of the holy or sacred (das Heilige) as
space in which the essence of the divine can unfold, he places
"the God and the gods" within a horizon that prevents authentic
transcendence. Within the dimension thus indicated only pantheism
and polytheism are possible, a divinization of Being and beings,
followed by all the violences that belong to idolatry. (Peperzak,
Beyond, 35)

By following Nietzsche in unmasking the latent "humanism" - or selfcenteredness - of theodicy, Heidegger believes he has deconstructed the
Absolute altogether. But Nietzsche and Heidegger's critique of the God
of theodicy frees Levinas to conceive of the transcendent God in
ethical, not cosmological terms. Whereas Heidegger rethinks the sacred
as a dimension of Being which transcends the enframing function of
calculative-representational thinking, Levinas refigures God's height
as that trace in the face of the Other that disrupts an ontological
account of temporality altogether and puts our ethical responsibility
to be our brother's keeper before our ontological responsibility to
hear the call of Being. Put otherwise, Levinas places being-for-theOther - to the point of dying for the Other's sake - ahead of our
attachment to Being.

Heidegger's critique of "the metaphysics of presence"
inaugurated by Plato - according to which the the
temporary, changing and contingent realm of beings is
grounded in an eternal, unchanging, and necessary supreme
being - remains firmly on the Athenian road of Being, as
Heidegger seeks to revive authentic thinking at "the end of
metaphysics" by recalling us to the ontological difference
known by pre-Socratics like Anaximander, Parmenides and
Heraclitus. Whereas Heidegger's agreement with Nietzsche
that the God of theodicy is dead draws him away from the
transcendent God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob altogether,
Levinas enjoins us to rethink the meaning of Jerusalem as
"ethics without salvation": being-for-the-Other even at the
expense of my own desire to be.
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